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December 2008
RUSSIA CHALLENGES THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Stephen Blank
Strategic Studies Institute
Moscow threw down the gauntlet to Barack Obama the day after he became
president-elect. Russia threatens that unless the United States withdraws its 10 missile
defense networks from Poland and the Czech Republic, it will install Iskander cruise
missiles (which can be conventional or nuclear) in Kaliningrad on Poland’s borders and
jam the radars in the Czech Republic. Moscow makes several assertions to justify its
threat. First, it claims that no Iranian missile or nuclear threat exists. Therefore, the only
logical target for these systems is Russia and its missile complexes. Consequently, these
systems can be used to threaten or neutralize Russian targets. Either Russian missiles
would be attacked by a conventional air and space first strike, possibly involving these
networks in Europe, or these missile defenses would frustrate a retaliatory second
strike, leaving Russia defenseless. So while 10 systems do not constitute a threat, they
do represent the first stage of a planned or potential U.S. buildup of a missile network
in Europe that could neutralize Russia’s first and/or second strike capabilities and shift
the burden of prosecuting any war to Europe.
Second, stationing missile defenses at these locations constitutes a pretext for
stationing offensive missiles there, also. That forces Moscow to assume the worst case
scenario and could cause Russia to attempt to shoot them down, leading to a conflict
with the United States. Therefore, these defenses rupture the fabric of strategic stability.
In Moscow’s concept of strategic stability, neither side has the freedom of action or
margin of superiority that might encourage it to believe it could employ coercive
diplomacy or military force with impunity. The strategic stability equation is critically
important to Russia because, otherwise, Washington might be tempted to think it could
strike at Russia with minimal consequence.
Russia’s arguments are literally incredible. First, missile defenses do work as
Japanese, Israeli, and U.S. tests have shown. Second, Iran’s Ashura and Sajil missiles
with a 2,000 kilometer range threaten not just Israel, Europe, and Russia. In fact,
Russian officials frequently tell the U.S. Government in private of their apprehensions
about the Iranian threat against which Moscow has no defense. Third, Russian officials
know and admit that these 10 interceptors and radar systems are technically incapable
of threatening their missiles and are not a threat to Russia.

Why, then, did Russia issue this ultimatum? Close examination of Russian policy
reveals that these defenses entrench the United States in Eastern Europe’s military
defense and foreclose Russia’s hope of intimidating Central and Eastern Europe or of
reestablishing its hegemony there and possibly even in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). If missile defenses exist in Europe, Russian missile threats are
greatly diminished, if not negated. Because empire and the creation of a fearsome
domestic enemy justify and are the inextricable corollaries of internal autocracy, the end
of empire allegedly entails Russia’s irrevocable decline as a great power and—the
crucial point—generates tremendous pressure for domestic reform.
Moscow cannot conceive of its security in terms other than those of an adversarial
relationship with the United States and NATO. That relationship is based on both
global and regional deterrence and what Moscow calls strategic stability—where both
sides are locked into the Cold War relationship of mutually assured destruction at the
global and regional level. For Russia to be secure, not only must the United States not be
able to defend itself against missile threats, neither can Europe, for then Russia cannot
intimidate it by the threat of missile strikes. Russia still believes that the condition of its
security is the insecurity of its neighbors and partners. Consequently, to secure itself,
Russia must have the right to supervise the limits of Europe’s defense activity, thereby
revising the settlements of 1989-91.
Paradoxically, Russia’s threats of missile strikes against virtually every nation from
the Baltic states to Georgia and even Germany, which Iskanders in Kaliningrad can
target, arguably demonstrate the need for both missile defenses and for NATO’s
continuing robustness, if not enlargement. If Russia is so concerned about these
missiles, it would be better advised to use its influence in Iran to stop that country from
building nuclear weapons. The incoming administration would be equally well-advised
to reject Russia’s threats and deal directly with Iran, as President-Elect Obama promised
to do during his campaign.
Yielding to Moscow’s threats and demands for withdrawing these inoffensive
systems would only divide Europe further and generate splits between European
powers and the United States. Already states whose governments are enmeshed in
lucrative business deals with Russia are calling for such negotiations and attempting to
mediate between Washington and Moscow in the hope that they can increase their
leverage vis-à-vis both capitals and continue to make money. Such efforts at
appeasement undermine the structure of European security and only confirm Moscow’s
belief in the utility of its threatening behavior. Neither the United States nor European
states can accept that Russia can decide the limits of sovereign independent
governments’ security in Eastern Europe. Numerous European officials have described
Russia as a mafia state. Its penchant for trying to intimidate its neighbors and
interlocutors, in this case with nuclear strikes, exemplifies the accuracy of that
perception. The Obama administration and European governments should recognize
these threats for what they are and act accordingly.
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